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total returns of US REITs over the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In this paper we show that preparing ahead of
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REITs which reduced leverage and increased maturity prior to the crisis fared better during the crisis. For
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during the crisis. We further find that US REITs with the highest capital structure risk (high leverage and
short maturities) were more likely to prepare for the crisis ahead by reducing leverage and extending maturity.
This effect is especially large for REITs with strong governance. We also document that none of our findings
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1 Introduction
REIT managers can mitigate the risk in the capital structure of their firms in two
fundamental ways: they can always be conservative, or they can dynamically adjust
the capital structure in anticipation of future market conditions. Sun, Titman, and
Twite (2014) find that firms with a conservative capital structure at the start of the
2007-2009 financial crisis fared better during the crisis. We extend this work by doc-
umenting that REITs which adjusted their capital structure prior to the crisis fared
particularly well during the crisis, even when controlling for their capital structure
as of the start of 2007. In other words, shareholders rewarded those REIT managers
who correctly anticipated the crisis and took precautionary actions to prepare for it.
This result highlights a unique method through which REIT managers can add value
to their firms. In addition to selecting good properties, repositioning/redeveloping
them, and managing them, REIT managers can add substantial value through dy-
namically adjusting the capital structure of their firms. For instance, our estimates
suggest that one standard deviation reduction of leverage before the crisis generated
five percent higher cumulative return during the crisis.
More specifically, Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014) find that several risky capital
structure characteristics, namely high leverage, a high share of debt due two and
three years in the future, and a high share of variable-rate debt, significantly reduce
the cumulative total returns of US REITs over the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In this
paper we replicate these findings. We extend this analysis further and document that
REITs which reduced leverage and increased maturity prior to the crisis (over 2006)
fared better during the crisis (2007-2009). These results hold even when controlling
for the capital structure levels at the start of 2007.
We further find that US REITs with the highest capital structure risk (high leverage
and short maturity) were more likely to take precautions by reducing leverage and
extending maturity. This effect is especially strong for REITs with strong gover-
nance. In other words, preparation for the crisis was not a random event. Instead,
REITs with good governance and high exposure were the ones most likely to take
mitigating action.
As a robustness check, we investigate whether any of the effects can be observed in
European REITs. Since the real estate excesses prior to 2007 were mostly a U.S.
phenomena, shareholders of European REITs should not expect or reward prepa-
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ration. Indeed, we document that none of the above findings hold in our European
sample. In other words, European firms that reduced their leverage or increased
their maturity before the crisis received no benefit at all during the crisis. The find-
ing of no effect in Europe tentatively suggests that shareholders are as interested in
the signal that preparation sends as in the capital structure adjustment itself. Put
differently, US REIT managers were in the midst of numerous excesses and were
able to observe numerous warning signals. They should have adjusted their capital
structure prior to 2007, and doing so was perceived as a positive signal. European
markets were not subject to the same excesses, at least not to the same extent, so
adjusting the capital structure in Europe was not expected and/or rewarded.
The above findings paint a consistent and intuitive picture of REIT management
and shareholder behaviour. Good managers dynamically adjust the capital struc-
ture to balance the benefits of leverage against its costs, and shareholders reward
this appropriately. Nonetheless, we note that some of our conclusions are based on
relatively small samples and are subject to omitted variable bias. In the conclusion
we offer several avenues for extending the results reported here to mitigate these
deficiencies.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 outlines the related literature. Section 3 describes
our data and empirical method. Section 4 discusses results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Corporate capital structure choices are a topic of intense academic debate in the
literature. The three main approaches to analysing capital structure in general are
the trade-off between benefits and costs of debt, the hierarchy of funding choices as
suggested by the pecking order theory, or the choice of funding depending on the
underlying capital market conditions as proposed by the market timing theory. Costs
and benefits of debt are often examined in the context of agency conflicts, such as
risk-shifting from managers to outside debt holders. Our work adds primarily to the
literature on market timing and risk-shifting.
Managers may try to time the market when it is subject to behavioural biases
(Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2008; Frank and Nezafat, 2013; Huang and Ritter,
2009). 1 Managers may issue debt when investors offer especially favourable terms
1 Cochrane (2011) argues that market timing may also arise in a rational framework as managers optimally
respond to time-varying funding opportunities.
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(Stein, 1996). Baker and Wurgler (2002) develop the market timing theory as a first-
order determinant of capital structure. In this framework, managers are generally
indifferent between debt and equity. Their choice depends on the relative value of
these forms of capital in the financial markets at the time of issuance. Observed
capital structure then represents the cumulative outcome of managerial attempts to
time the market.
The empirical evidence for the market timing hypothesis is mixed. Baker and Wur-
gler (2002) show that an indicator measuring issuance decisions during favourable
periods in the equity and debt markets is persistently related to observed firm lever-
age over long periods of time post-issuance. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003)
find that firms study debt market conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost
maturity at which to borrow. Barry, Mann, Mihov, and Rodriguez (2008) present
evidence that firms issue more debt when interest rates are low relative to histori-
cal levels. Kaya (2012) shows that when the equity market is “hot”, firms tend to
choose equity financing over common forms of debt financing. However, Alti (2006)
studies initial public offerings and finds that the effect of market timing on leverage
levels vanishes after two years. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) conclude that
market-timing opportunities exert only an ancillary influence on seasoned equity
offerings. Butler, Cornaggia, Grullon, and Weston (2011) present evidence that, in-
consistent with the implication of the market timing theory, measures of managerial
market timing are unrelated to future returns.
Within the real estate literature, several studies investigate the impact of cur-
rent market conditions or historical performance on the choice of capital structure.
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) highlight that real estate is valued in the public
and private markets. They propose that REITs issue public equity when the rela-
tive cost is low and the price-to-NAV ratio is high. Empirically, Feng, Ghosh, and
Sirmans (2007) find little support for market timing in REIT leverage choices. How-
ever, Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011), Ooi, Ong, and Li (2010) and Boudry,
Kallberg, and Liu (2010) find evidence consistent with some broader implications of
this theory. Their results suggest a significant influence of the relative cost of debt,
market-wide default risk premia and firm-level default risk on REIT leverage levels.
Mori, Ooi, and Wong (2013) also present evidence that REITs time their capital
structure changes in response to conditions in the capital markets. Alcock, Baum,
Colley, and Steiner (2013) investigate the effect of leverage on private equity fund
performance. They study a global sample of direct real estate funds, using a mea-
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sure of overall leverage, with the main focus being the effect on returns of changes
in leverage incurred in anticipation of the future performance of the underlying real
estate market. They find that leverage on average has a negative impact on ex-
cess return performance, and that private equity real estate fund managers are not
successfully timing their leverage choices to match the future market environment.
The risk-shifting hypothesis is also well established in the literature. Allen and Gale
(1999), Herring and Wachter (1999) and Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006, 2009,
2011) find significant evidence of risk-shifting in real estate markets and document
the implication of this behaviour for the underlying markets. Furthermore, Chung,
Na, and Smith (2013) document that firms appear to increase leverage when they
face attractive growth opportunities or when poor operating performance under-
mines equity value.
This paper extends the above literature in a specific way. We conjecture that good
REIT managers adjust their capital structure in anticipation of real estate market
downturns because this minimises the negative effects of leverage. Such dynamic
behaviour maximises the potential benefits of leverage and minimises its costs. It
also reduces the risk-shifting problem, so it is likely beneficial to all parties involved
- mangers, shareholders, and lenders. As discussed above, numerous works investi-
gate the dynamic aspects of capital structure. However, we are not aware of any
studies that investigate the simple and intuitive question of whether REIT mangers
adjust ahead of anticipated market downturns, and whether shareholders reward
this behaviour. Our findings also suggest that shareholders use capital structure ad-
justments ahead of a market downturn as a signal for managerial quality that has
implications well outside the immediate consequences of the adjustments.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data set and descriptive statistics
We begin by considering all listed US and European equity REITs on SNL Financial
as of the end of 2005. We analyse capital structure choices in the year leading up
to the beginning of the recent financial crisis in 2007, i.e. capital structure choices
over the year 2006. Individual firm data is obtained from SNL Financial. The firms
in our sample cover the sectors Diversified, Health Care, Hotel, Office, Residential,
Retail and Specialty.
5
Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014) document the impact of leverage, debt maturity
(measured as the share of debt due in 2-3 years, corresponding to the share of debt
due during the crisis) and, to some extent, variable-rate debt on REIT performance
during the crisis period 2007 to 2009. We measure the variables in our analysis
following Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014). Performance during the crisis is measured
as the cumulative monthly rates of total return for the time period January 2007
to February 2009. The cumulative total return is winsorised at the 2nd and 98th
percentiles to mitigate any undue influence of outliers.
We focus on the leverage and maturity components of capital structure as the ev-
idence for the impact of variable-rate debt presented in Sun, Titman, and Twite
(2014) is mixed. We measure the change in leverage over the year 2006 as the first
difference of market leverage. The evolution of leverage may be driven by denomina-
tor effects through the market cycle. However, we assume that REIT managers are
aware of this effect and factor it into their capital structure choices through time.
Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book value of short-term and
long-term interest bearing debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value
of invested capital is defined as the sum of total debt, preferred stock and market
capitalisation, calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the end-
of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure the change in debt maturity as the
first difference of the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we have
to measure the change in debt maturity as the first difference of the share of debt
due in 1-5 years, as European REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule.
The control variables considered in our study are the level of leverage and the share of
debt due in 2-3 years, further the log of firm size (measured as market capitalisation),
Tobin’s Q (ratio of firm market value, i.e. market capitalisation plus total assets less
book value of equity, to total assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash
equivalents to total assets).
We obtain information on the firm’s corporate governance provisions from SNL.
The provisions covered by SNL are staggered board, poison pill, and supermajor-
ity requirements. The presence of these provisions restricts shareholder rights. We
calculate a governance score by starting from zero and adding a point for the pres-
ence of each provision. A higher governance score thus indicates a more dictatorial
firm with weaker shareholder rights. This variable allows us to assess the impact of
corporate governance on capital structure choices in the run-up to the crisis.
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The findings by Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014) show the differential impact of the
crisis on firms with different capital structures. Therefore, we first employ an uncon-
ditional analysis to explore the question of what characterises REIT capital structure
choice going into the crisis. Summary statistics as of the end of 2006 are presented
in Table 1. On average, the firms in the US part of our sample have reduced lever-
age and short-term debt (due in 2-3 years) marginally over the year 2006. However,
the variation around the mean is significant, with a standard deviation of 0.07 for
leverage and 0.24 for debt maturity, suggesting that capital structure choices during
2006 varied substantially across firms. The European firms in our sample have on
average reduced leverage over the year 2006 by the same amount as US firms, with
the same standard deviation. It appears that the European firms have increased the
share of debt due in the short-to-medium term. However, this measure is a noisy
indicator of the debt due during the crisis, as reporting rules only require European
firms to disclose the amount of debt due in 1 to 5 years, rather than on an annual
basis.
The levels of leverage are similar across the US and European firms (0.39 versus
0.35), but the maturity measures are not comparable, due to reporting differences.
The mean of the SNL governance score is lower in the US than in Europe (0.34
versus 0.59), suggesting strong shareholder rights in the US. European REITs are
on average slightly smaller than their US counterparts (log of firm size of 13.98 to
14.20), have a lower Tobin’s Q (1.15 versus 1.55), hold similar levels of cash-to-assets
(0.03) and have experienced similar cumulative total returns over the period of the
crisis 2007 to 2007 (-0.56 and -0.59).
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Furthermore, Table 2 below shows levels of correlation below 0.8 among the main
predictors of interest, alleviating concerns about multicollinearity.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
3.2 Empirical method
Capital structure choices in 2006 and performance during the crisis
In order to tie our analysis in with the findings in Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014),
we first examine the extent to which the capital structure adjustments that REIT
managers made during 2006 are related to REIT performance in terms of cumulative
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total returns during the subsequent crisis period 2007 to 2009. In order to explore
the effect of leverage choices, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression for
the US REITs in our sample using OLS:
CTRi = β0 + β1D.MLevi + β2MLevi + β3LNSizei + β4Qi + β5Cashi + ui (1)
where β0 is a constant, βj is the regression coefficient corresponding to the ex-
planatory variable j and u is the residual. Subscript i refers to firm i. CTR is the
cumulative total return 2007-2009. D.MLev is the change in leverage during 2006.
MLev is the level of leverage at the end of 2006, capturing the effect documented in
Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014). LNSize is the log of firm size, Q is Tobin’s Q, and
Cash is the cash-to-assets ratio, all measured as of the end of 2006. We also include
sector fixed-effects and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
In order to explore the effect of changes in maturity during 2006, we run regression
(1) and replace the leverage-related variables with the change in the share of debt
due in 2-3 years during 2006, D.Mat23.
CTRi = β0 + β1D.Mat23i + β2LNSizei + β3Qi + β4Cashi + ui (2)
Further, in order to explore the relationships between capital structure choices and
performance during the crisis in the European firms in our sample, we run the re-
gressions for these firms separately. In the maturity equation, we replace the variable
measuring the change in debt due in 2-3 years during 2006 with the change in debt
due in 1-5 years during 2006, D.Mat15.
CTRi = β0 + β1D.Mat15i + β2LNSizei + β3Qi + β4Cashi + ui (3)
Cross-sectional analysis
The analysis in Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014) provides empirical evidence that the
firms that are most exposed to the adverse effects of a financial shock during the
crisis are those with high leverage and short maturity. Therefore, we examine the
question whether those firms that were most at risk were aware of their situation
and were more likely to adjust their capital structure to a more robust position in
the run-up to the crisis.
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We estimate the following logit model for the US REITs in our sample:
Redi = β0 + β1L.MLevi + β2L.LNSizei + β3L.Qi + β4L.Cashi + ui (4)
where β0 is a constant, βj is the regression coefficient corresponding to the explana-
tory variable j and u is the residual. Red is the likelihood that a firm reduced leverage
by 0.05 or more in 2006. While the specific cut-off level of 5 percent is arbitrary, it
does capture the notion that the leverage reduction needs to be substantial to be
identified as a clear managerial choice. As we report below, the significance of β1
is robust to a very wide range of cut-off levels for the leverage reduction variable,
including including its mean and median. L.MLev is the lag of leverage, measured
at the end of 2005. LNSize is the lagged log of firm size, Q is lagged Tobin’s Q,
and Cash is the lagged cash-to-assets ratio, all measured as of the end of 2005. If
the firms with higher leverage were aware of their situation and took precautionary
measures to de-lever in the run-up to the crisis, then β1 will be positive and signif-
icant. We also include sector fixed-effects. As before, we run the regressions for the
US and European sample firms separately.
In order to explore the likelihood that a firm extends risky short maturity, we run
regression (4) and replace the dependent variable with the likelihood that a firm
extends debt maturity through reducing the share of debt due in 2-3 years by 5
percent or more in 2006. Similarly to the reduction in leverage, the choice of 5
percent is very specific. As we note in the results section, the significance of β1 is
again robust for a wide range of cut-off values, including the mean and the median
of the independent variable. The dependent variable is then labelled Ext23. The
main variable of interest is the lagged share of debt due in 2-3 years, L.Mat23. If
firms with short maturities were aware of their refinancing risk and adjusted capital
structure accordingly, then the coefficient on the variable L.Mat23 will be positive
and significant. As before, we include sector fixed-effects.
Ext23i = β0 + β1L.Mat23i + β2L.LNSizei + β3L.Qi + β4L.Cashi + ui (5)
Further, in order to explore the precautions in the run-up to the crisis in the Euro-
pean firms in our sample, we run the regressions for these firms separately. In the
maturity equation, we replace the Ext23 variable with the likelihood that a firm
extended debt maturity through reducing the share of debt due in 1-5 years by 5
percent or more in 2006, Ext15, with the main dependent variable of interest be-
9
ing the share of debt due in 1-5 years in 2005, L.Mat15. If the European REITs
with short maturities were aware of their refinancing risk and adjusted capital struc-
ture accordingly, then the coefficient on the variable L.Mat15 will be positive and
significant. As before, we include sector fixed-effects.
Ext15i = β0 + β1L.Mat15i + β2L.LNSizei + β3L.Qi + β4L.Cashi + ui (6)
Finally, we explore the role of corporate governance on the extent to which REITs
with risky capital structures took precautionary measures to create more robust
capital structures in the run-up to the crisis. In this analysis, we create interaction
terms with the capital structure variables that put firms at risk from a financial shock
as suggested in Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014). For the US part of the sample, we
create a dummy/interaction term for those firms that had above-median leverage or
above-median shares of debt due in 2-3 years at the end of 2005. We estimate the
following logit model for the sample of US REITs:
Redi = β0 + β1HighLevi ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.MLevi + β3L.SNLGovi (7)
+ β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
where L.SNLGov is the lag of the SNL governance score calculated as of the end
of 2005, and the other coefficients and variables are defined as in (4). If stronger
shareholder rights had an effect in reining in the refinancing risk of excessively
leveraged firms, then we will observe a positive and significant coefficient on the
interaction variable with a dummy based on below-average values of L.SNLGov,
where a higher governance score indicates weaker shareholder rights. Similarly to
(7), we estimate this regression for the likelihood to extend maturity for the sample
of US REITs:
Ext23i = β0 + β1ShortMat23i ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.Mat23 + β3L.SNLGovi (8)
+ β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
where coefficients and variables are defined as in (7). As before, we include sector
fixed effects in all of these regressions.
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For the European firms in the sample, replicate this analysis as follows:
RedEuri = β0 + β1HighLevi ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.MLevi + β3L.SNLGovi (9)
+ β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
Ext15i = β0 + β1ShortMat15i ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.Mat15 (10)
+ β3L.SNLGovi + β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
4 Results
The main result of our analysis is that reducing leverage before the crisis (over
2006) helped US REITs during the crisis (2007-2009). This result holds even when
we control for leverage just before the crisis (end of 2006). The first column of Table
3 reports the regression estimates behind this result. As discussed above, change
in leverage is the change in market leverage from end of 2005 to end of 2006. This
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. A negative coefficient
implies that a reduction in leverage was associated with higher cumulative returns
during the crisis. This is robust to including market leverage at the end of 2006 and
typical control variables. It is also robust to including 2005 market leverage (not
reported in the table).
The impact of a change in leverage before the crisis on cumulative returns during the
crisis is not only statistically significant and robust, but also of substantial economic
magnitude. The estimated coefficient of -.783 implies that a one percentage point
reduction in leverage before the crisis generated 78 basis points higher return during
the crisis. Reducing leverage by one standard deviation (seven percentage points)
increases cumulative returns during the crisis by 5.5 percent. Given the size of the
REIT industry, this change alone translates into well over ten billion dollars of
additional market value at the end of the crisis. Of course we realise that if all
REITs reduced leverage more than they did before the crisis, the market response
on average would have likely been more muted. Even with this caveat, the impact
of leverage reduction is economically meaningful and substantial.
Column 3 of Table 3 reproduces this basic result for European REITs. As discussed
in the introduction, one would not expect a decrease in leverage to benefit European
REITs at all. In fact, we find that leverage reduction before the crisis hurt European
firms. Given the small number of observations for this regression, we do not have very
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high confidence in the positive coefficient. However, it appears that this coefficient
is almost certainly not negative, which is consistent with our expectation.
Our next result, reported in Column 2 of Table 3, shows that a decrease in debt due
in 2 or 3 years (over 2006) benefitted US REITs during the crisis. Once again, this
suggests that preparation for the crisis helped during the crisis. Again, this result
is not present in the European sample, consistent with our overall hypothesis. We
do note that this particular result is not robust to including the level of debt due in
2 or 3 years at the start of the crisis. If both the change and the level are included
in the regression, neither is significant. This may be due to the significant negative
correlation between the change in debt due in 2 or 3 years and its level at the start
of the crisis. While this particular result in itself is inconclusive, its combination
with the market leverage result discussed above supports our main hypothesis that
preparation for the crisis helped during the crisis.
Next, we investigate which firms were more likely to prepare for the crisis. This
is interesting in itself, but more importantly it has the potential to further shed
light on our main hypothesis. If firms prepare at random, then our conjecture that
preparation matters becomes less significant as it lacks any prescriptive implications.
However, as reported in Table 4, firms that were most exposed prior to the crisis
were the ones most likely to prepare. Column 1 reports that firms with high leverage
were more likely to reduce leverage prior to the crisis. Column 2 presents the result
that firms with the highest proportion of debt due in years 2 and 3 were most likely
to reduce this exposure. Both coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, and
robust to the inclusion of standard controls. While this specific result is based on
the 5 percent cut-off used to identify firms that reduced leverage or reduced debt
maturing in years 2 or 3, the significance of the market leverage and debt maturing
in years 2 and 3 variables is robust to a very wide range of cut-off values for the
dependent variable, including its mean and median. Furthermore, consistent with
our main hypothesis, neither result holds for our European sample.
We further investigate whether firms with better governance were more likely to
prepare for the crisis. While appealing and precisely measured, the SNL governance
score is likely an imperfect measure of management quality. Therefore, we proceed
very cautiously with this step. Even with this caveat, we find that highly levered firms
that had better governance were most likely to reduce leverage. Column 1 of Table
5 reports that an interaction variable that takes the value of 1 if market leverage
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and governance are above average and 0 otherwise is significant at the 10 percent
level. This result holds even when market leverage and the raw governance score are
included in the estimation. Therefore, the effect of good governance is above and
beyond the market leverage effect reported in Table 4 and discussed above. Again,
as expected, this result is not present in the European sample.
To summarise our findings, US REITs that prepared for the crisis did better during
the crisis. Furthermore, REITs that were most exposed, particularly if they had
strong governance, were most likely to prepare. None of these results are present
in the European sample. Taken together, these results suggest that preparation for
the crisis was expected and rewarded for US REITs, especially the ones that really
needed it.
While the results reported here paint a consistent and intuitive picture, we acknowl-
edge some limitations in our methodology. First and foremost, our samples are small.
The US sample consists of 126 firms (as low as 81 in some regressions). The European
sample is even smaller, with 40-50 observations in the various setups. Furthermore,
while our results are robust to modifications in the exact regression equations or to
changes in the cut-off levels used to define some of the variables, we likely face higher
than typical model specification error. The relationships we try to investigate are
complex and subject to numerous interactions that we are unable to consider due to
the limited sample. Moreover, we inevitably rely on accounting measures, which are
prone to measurement error and often do not fully reflect the variable of interest.
We also use the SNL governance score, which is widely accepted in industry but an
imperfect measure of management quality. Finally, our models may omit important
variables. In the conclusion we propose several avenues to addressing some of these
shortcomings.
5 Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that US REITs that adjusted their capital structure ahead of
the 2007-2009 financial crisis outperformed their peers during the crisis. This result
holds even when controlling for the capital structure characteristics at the start of
the crisis. In other words, it was not purely the state of a firm’s capital structure
at the start of the crisis that mattered, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
how the firm reached that state. This result highlights the importance of REIT
management. Our findings are consistent with the view that not only can REIT
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managers add value through property selection and management, but they can also
add substantial value to their shareholders by dynamically adjusting the capital
structure of their firms. For instance, our results suggest that one standard deviation
reduction in leverage resulted in five percent higher cumulative return during the
crisis. This interpretation highlights the importance of understanding and managing
capital structure choices, through academic research and implementation in industry
practice.
Specifically, Sun, Titman, and Twite (2014) find that risky capital structure char-
acteristics, such as high leverage, high share of debt due in the near future and
high share of variable-rate debt, significantly reduce the cumulative total returns
of US REITs over the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Our work extends this finding by
documenting that preparing ahead of the crisis also significantly influenced the cu-
mulative return over the crisis period. We document that REITs which reduced
leverage and increased maturity prior to the crisis fared better during the crisis. We
further find that US REITs with the highest capital structure risk (high leverage
and short maturities) were more likely to take precautions by reducing leverage and
extending maturity. This effect is especially strong for REITs with strong gover-
nance. We also document that none of our findings hold for European REITs. This
suggests that since European firms did not experience the levels of market excess
observed in the US before the crisis, whether they took precautions or not had no
impact on their returns during the crisis.
We focus on capital structure because this is one avenue through which REIT man-
agers can mitigate the downside exposure of their firm without giving up upside po-
tential. Alternatively, managers are able to sell properties, but this choice is costly.
As the timing and magnitude of the crisis was likely unknown even to the most in-
formed industry insiders, capital structure adjustments were the preferred and less
costly preparation method.
While our empirical conclusions paint a consistent and intuitive picture of REIT
managerial behaviour and investor expectations, our analysis does suffer from several
potential shortfalls and should be taken with caution. First and foremost, our sample
sizes are small. Second, our analysis potentially suffers from omitted variable bias
and from errors in variables. Future research may address many of these concerns
by investigating the REIT industry actions using property-level data. For instance,
one might investigate if REITs that experienced the largest underlying property
14
price declines adjusted their capital structure ahead of the crisis the most. Or, one
might study the capital structure adjustment while considering the property price
declines. At the very least, this amounts to controlling for property price evolution
for each REIT in the regression models we estimate. But it can go further - one
might investigate whether the financing arrangements for particular properties were
altered ahead of the crisis. These extensions would certainly solve the sample size
issue as well as eliminate some of the omitted variables. In short, our work at the
very least brings up the possibility that preparation for the crisis matters and makes
the additional effort and expense associated with collecting property-level data of
interest.
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6 Figures and Tables
Descriptive statistics for listed equity REITs, 2006
US
Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Change in leverage 126 -0.02 0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.08
Change debt due in 2-3 years 99 -0.02 0.24 -0.41 -0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.30
Market leverage 130 0.39 0.16 0.05 0.31 0.39 0.49 0.63
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 104 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.30 0.56
SNL governance score 136 0.34 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Log of firm size 132 14.20 1.54 10.90 13.65 14.39 15.15 16.40
Tobin’s Q 130 1.55 0.46 1.11 1.24 1.48 1.66 2.32
Cash to assets 132 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.12
Cumulative return 2007-2009 113 -0.59 0.26 -0.93 -0.80 -0.62 -0.43 -0.12
Europe
Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Change in leverage 52 -0.02 0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.15
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 43 0.04 0.16 -0.18 -0.07 0.02 0.16 0.34
Market leverage 59 0.35 0.19 0.00 0.26 0.33 0.44 0.78
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 49 0.42 0.31 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.61 1.00
SNL governance score 68 0.59 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Log of firm size 60 13.98 1.37 12.03 13.10 13.92 14.89 16.23
Tobin’s Q 59 1.15 0.30 0.75 1.03 1.12 1.20 1.68
Cash to assets 59 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15
Cumulative return 2007-2009 63 -0.56 0.23 -0.88 -0.72 -0.58 -0.37 -0.19
Table 1
The table shows the summary statistics for the sample firms, all US and European listed equity REITs on
SNL, at the end of 2006. Variables are defined as outlined below. We measure the change in leverage over the
year 2006 as the first difference of market leverage. Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book
value of short-term and long-term interest bearing debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value
of invested capital is defined as the sum of total debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated
as number of shares outstanding multiplied by the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure the
change in debt maturity as the first difference of the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we
have to measure the change in debt maturity as the first difference of the share of debt due in 1-5 years, as
European REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule. The control variables considered in our study
are the level of leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years, further the log of firm size (measured as
market capitalisation), Tobin’s Q (ratio of firm market value, i.e. market capitalisation plus total assets less
book value of equity, to total assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash equivalents to total assets).
We obtain information on the firm’s corporate governance provisions from SNL. The provisions covered by
SNL are staggered board, poison pill, and supermajority requirements. The presence of these provisions
restricts shareholder rights. We calculate a governance score by starting from zero and adding a point for
the presence of each provision.
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Regression results for cumulative total return, 2007-2009
Dependent variable: Cumulative total return 2007-2009 (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES US US Europe Europe
Change in leverage -0.783** 1.296**
(-2.06) (2.11)
Change in share of debt due in 2-3 years -0.333***
(-2.90)
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 0.347
(1.39)
Market leverage -0.455** -0.194
(-2.31) (-0.89)
Log of firm size -0.055*** -0.056** 0.006 -0.048*
(-2.95) (-2.06) (0.16) (-1.95)
Tobin’s Q -0.062 0.125** 0.153 0.261***
(-0.99) (2.29) (1.58) (2.81)
Cash to assets -0.206 0.141 -0.461 -0.912
(-0.58) (0.57) (-0.61) (-1.01)
Constant 0.686** 0.337 -0.892* -0.372
(2.44) (0.91) (-1.96) (-1.13)
Observations 106 81 47 40
R-squared 0.367 0.431 0.209 0.194
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 3
The table shows the results of the OLS model estimated for the sample firms, the listed equity REITs
on SNL in the US and in Europe. The dependent variable is the cumulative total return over the period
2007/2009. All independent variables are measured at the end of 2006, with the exception of the variables
measuring the changes in capital structure, which are measured during the year 2006. Variables are defined
as follows. We measure the change in leverage over the year 2006 as the first difference of market leverage.
Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book value of short-term and long-term interest bearing
debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value of invested capital is defined as the sum of total
debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated as number of shares outstanding multiplied by
the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure the change in debt maturity as the first difference
of the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we have to measure the change in debt maturity
as the first difference of the share of debt due in 1-5 years, as European REITs do not report a year-by-year
debt schedule. The control variables considered in our study are the level of leverage and the share of debt
due in 2-3 years, further the log of firm size (measured as market capitalisation), Tobin’s Q (ratio of firm
market value, i.e. market capitalisation plus total assets less book value of equity, to total assets), and the
cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash equivalents to total assets). We account for property sector effects using
dummy variables. The t-statistics, calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are shown in
parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Regression results for likelihood to reduce leverage or extend maturity, 2006
REGION US Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
Market leverage 6.230*** 4.216
(2.82) (1.51)
Share of debt due in 2nd & 3rd year 10.022***
(3.85)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 1.662
(1.10)
Log of firm size 0.225 -0.415* 0.867** -0.293
(1.37) (-1.81) (2.46) (-0.86)
Tobin’s Q 1.491 0.101 2.59 3.195
(1.33) (0.09) (0.99) (1.61)
Cash to assets 5.654 -0.649 5.052 -8.08
(1.12) (-0.11) (0.77) (-0.84)
Constant -9.941*** 4.126 -17.390*** -1.019
(-3.07) (1.41) (-2.72) (-0.22)
Observations 126 90 48 41
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R squared 0.127 0.26 0.278 0.162
Table 4
The table shows the results of the logit model estimated for the sample firms, the listed equity REITs on
SNL in the US (columns (1) and (2)) and in Europe (columns (3) and (4)). The dependent variable is
the likelihood to reduce leverage (columns (1) and (3)) or extend maturity (columns (2) and (4)) by 0.05
or more during 2006. Independent variables are lagged by one year, i.e. they are measured at the end of
2005. Variables are defined as follows. Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book value of
short-term and long-term interest bearing debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value of invested
capital is defined as the sum of total debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated as number
of shares outstanding multiplied by the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure debt maturity
as the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we have to measure debt maturity as the share of
debt due in 1-5 years, as European REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule. The control variables
considered in our study are the level of leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years, further the log of firm
size (measured as market capitalisation), Tobin’s Q (ratio of firm market value, i.e. market capitalisation plus
total assets less book value of equity, to total assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash equivalents
to total assets). We account for property sector effects using dummy variables. The z-statistics are shown in
parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Regression results for likelihood to reduce leverage or extend maturity as a function of
corporate governance, 2006
REGION US Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
High leverage * Strong governance 1.217* -0.155
(1.88) (-0.10)
Short maturity * Strong governance 0.46 29.597
(0.52) (0.01)
Market leverage 4.510* 4.18
(1.92) (1.18)
Share of debt due in 2nd & 3rd year 9.262***
(3.17)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 0.837
(0.48)
SNL governance score 0.291 0.403 -1.216 29.602
(0.51) (0.50) (-1.06) (0.01)
Log of firm size 0.185 -0.406* 0.919** -0.287
(1.11) (-1.77) (2.49) (-0.83)
Tobin’s Q 1.87 -0.065 3.492 2.704
(1.63) (-0.06) (1.15) (1.38)
Cash to assets 5.87 -0.791 6.739 -8.473
(1.18) (-0.14) (0.97) (-0.90)
Constant -9.799*** 4.095 -18.380*** -29.726
(-2.93) (1.39) (-2.60) (-0.01)
Observations 126 96 48 41
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R squared 0.153 0.298 0.308 0.202
Table 5
The table shows the results of the logit model estimated for the sample firms, the listed equity REITs on
SNL in the US (columns (1) and (2)) and in Europe (columns (3) and (4)). In the US sample, we focus on
the interaction between high (above-median) leverage (column (1)) or below-median shares of debt maturing
in 2-3 years (column (2)). The dependent variable is the likelihood to reduce leverage (columns (1) and (3))
or extend maturity (columns (2) and (4)) by 0.05 or more in 2006. Independent variables are lagged by
one year, i.e. they are measured at the end of 2005. For Europe, the analysis is analogous to the US, only
we replace the maturity variable with the above-median share of debt maturing in 1-5 years. Variables are
defined as follows. We obtain information on the firm’s corporate governance provisions from SNL. The
provisions covered by SNL are staggered board, poison pill, and supermajority requirements. The presence
of these provisions restricts shareholder rights. We calculate a governance score by starting from zero and
adding a point for the presence of each provision. Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book
value of short-term and long-term interest bearing debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value of
invested capital is defined as the sum of total debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated as
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure debt
maturity as the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we have to measure debt maturity
as the share of debt due in 1-5 years, as European REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule. The
control variables considered in our study are the level of leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years,
further the log of firm size (measured as market capitalisation), Tobin’s Q (ratio of firm market value, i.e.
market capitalisation plus total assets less book value of equity, to total assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio
(cash and cash equivalents to total assets). We account for property sector effects using dummy variables.
The z-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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